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 Ultimate Causes of State Formation: 
The Significance of Biogeography, Diffusion, 
and Neolithic Revolutions 
Michael Bang Petersen & Svend-Erik Skaaning  
Abstract: »Ultimative Ursachen für die Staatsbildung: Die Signifikanz von Bi-
ogeographie, Diffusion und Neolithische Revolutionen«. The timing of early 
state formation varies across the world. Inspired by Jared Diamond’s seminal 
work, we employ large-n statistics to demonstrate how this variation has been 
structured by prehistoric biogeographical conditions, which have influenced 
the timing of the transition from hunter/gatherer production to agriculture and, 
in turn, the timing of state formation. Biogeography structures both the extent 
to which societies have invented agriculture and state technology de novo, and 
the extent to which these inventions have diffused from adjacent societies. Im-
portantly, we demonstrate how these prehistoric processes have continued to 
shape state formation by influencing the relative competitiveness of states until 
the near present.  
Keywords: State formation, Neolithic revolution, Agriculture, Biogeogra-
phy. 
 
The history of states is a tale about variation. States emerged in ancient Meso-
potamia as early as 5000 years ago, whereas centralized governments did not 
appear on the English Isles until 3000 years later or in North America until 
about 400 years ago. One might explain this variation in the timing of early 
state formation by pointing to the role of great individuals that abound in the 
history of state formation. However, in this article, we pursue the argument that 
such differences across time and space are not arbitrary but systematic. Build-
ing upon the work of Jared Diamond (1997), we present a line of reasoning 
accentuating the imprint of a set of prehistoric biogeographical conditions, 
which continuously shaped state development since its very beginning. 
In their most simple form, we seek to answer two questions. First, why has 
the timing of state formation varied so markedly across the world? Second, 
what have been the long-term consequences for stateness of these differences? 
In its most simple form, our answer is that the timing of the rise of complex 
political organization was structured by the timing of the Neolithic revolution, 
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i.e., the transition from hunter/gatherer production to agriculture, which set off 
an autocatalytic process of centralization eventually leading to state formation. 
The introduction of agriculture was, in turn, massively influenced by the fact 
that the last ice age left different parts of the world with different conditions in 
form of climate and fauna, which again influenced the costs and therefore the 
timing of the Neolithic revolution. 
These factors matter, we argue, because they have continuously structured 
the relative competitiveness of states. Territories experiencing early state for-
mation have simply been more likely to uphold stateness throughout history. 
Therefore, they had a competitive edge vis-à-vis other territories with late or no 
state formation in the regional and later global struggle about who occupied or 
colonized whom. In sum, we pursue the claim that, to a significant extent, 
when the glaciers of the last ice age withdrew and left the system of climate 
zones we know today, the destinies of the different regions in terms of state 
formation was being determined. 
In developing this account, we move beyond the state literature’s traditional 
focus on the European national (sovereign) states and their formation (e.g., 
Spruyt, 1994; Ertman, 1997). Rather, we focus on states as a more general 
mode of organization including, for example, city-states, feudal states, and 
empires. Specifically, we follow Charles Tilly (1992: 1-2) and understand 
states as “coercion-wielding organizations that are distinct from households 
and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other 
organizations within substantial territories”. Our framework for understanding 
the emergence of this general class of organization focuses on two sets of fac-
tors both influencing the timing of transition at each explanatory stage: precon-
ditions and diffusion. More particularly, each stage in the development from 
hunter-gatherer food production to the formation of a large-scale state can be 
reached through two principally different pathways. First, the necessary tech-
nological advances (e.g., the cultivation of crops suitable for agriculture) can be 
generated de novo. Second, these advances can be acquired from adjacent 
societies through processes of diffusion. Nevertheless, both preconditions and 
potential for diffusion are heavily structured by biogeography relating to conti-
nental extension, climate, and fauna. Based on these two sets of factors, we set 
up a sweeping model to explain the links between 1) hunter-gatherer econo-
mies, 2) agricultural production, 3) early state formations, and 4) subsequent 
state formations and levels of stateness, i.e., the degree to which a given terri-
tory is ruled by a locally based government above the chiefdom level. 
In his book, Guns, Germs, and Steel, Diamond (1997) utilized a wide range 
of detailed case studies to develop this account of state formation. Inspired by 
Diamond’s work, our ambition is to test his argument using large-n quantitative 
statistics. Thus, while extant anthropological case studies of state formation 
have established links between state emergence and the Neolithic revolution, 
 202
“controlled comparisons employing large samples of cases and statistical 
methods are virtually non-existent” (Peregrine et al., 2007: 76). 
Our endeavor is made possible by the pioneering data collection efforts of 
the economists Douglas Hibbs and Ola Olsson (2004; Olsson and Hibbs, 2005) 
and Louis Putterman (2007). Focusing on measures of economic performance, 
they have used quantitative methods to explore and confirm the basic validity 
of the importance of biogeography for the timing of the Neolithic revolution 
and subsequent economic development. Supplementing and using their data, 
we improve on the modeling of the causal sequences and extend the findings to 
the realm of politics by investigating the causes and effects of the timing of the 
Neolithic revolutions in the context of state formation. 
One caveat is due: We fully acknowledge that the human history of state 
formation is full of twists and turns and surprising events. But the scope of this 
article does not allow us to discuss them further. 13,000 years of history is 
encompassed, meaning that our explanatory dynamics have to be placed at a 
high level of generality. Ideographic specialists might find these sweeping 
explanations too simplistic and point to specific cases at odds with the general 
trends we outline. This said, however, we are confident that we – empirically 
speaking – are significantly more right than wrong, on average. To achieve 
such general results is, after all, the basic premise and goal of this inquiry. 
Timing of the Neolithic Revolution and the Origin of the 
State 
The state as central political organizations is an extremely recent invention in 
the evolutionary history of humans. All available evidence suggests that our 
species, Homo sapiens, evolved in societies with far less complex economic 
and political organizations. Economically, the Homo-lineage has since its ad-
vent with Homo Ergaster 1.8 million years ago depended entirely on hunted 
and gathered food (Boyd & Silk, 2003). Hence, early human societies were 
foraging societies. Politically, current evidence suggests that social obligations 
beyond simple friendship were defined exclusively in terms of kinship. Ac-
cording to van Creveld (1999: 2), “there were no superiors except for men, 
elders, and parents, and no inferiors except for women, youngsters, and off-
spring including in-laws”. Archaeological evidence suggests that a change of 
these political conditions originates from approximately 3000 BC. Over thou-
sands of years, bands and tribes, i.e., kin-based forms of political organization, 
gave way to more centralized forms of government in the form of increasingly 
complex chiefdoms followed by the first archaic states in ancient Egypt and 
Mesopotamia. Importantly, these political processes were paralleled by changes 
in economic conditions, especially, early inventions and promotions of agricul-
ture (Allen, 1997; Maisels, 1990). 
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The parallel developments in the spheres of subsistence economy and politi-
cal organization are far from accidental. Rather, the transition from a hunter-
gatherer economy to agricultural production was essential for the formation of 
chiefdoms and, subsequently, states as agriculture enabled and advanced cen-
tral political organization. By implication, the earlier a society shifted to agri-
cultural production, the earlier a state could emerge. Therefore, we argue, the 
timing of the Neolithic revolution in a given region should determine the tim-
ing of the origin of state in that very region. Below we unfold this argument in 
more detail. 
The available archaeological and anthropological evidence strongly suggests 
that when we talk about the Neolithic revolution, the rise of agriculture pre-
ceded the effects of political organization; research has yet to discover a prehis-
toric society with centralized political organization but without agricultural 
food production (Putterman, 2008; Wright, 1977). Agriculture provides a num-
ber of preconditions for the emergence of states as centralized political organi-
zations governing over territory (see e.g., Diamond, 1997; Peregrine et al., 
2007). First, hunter/gatherer-groups are nomadic whereas, in contrast, agricul-
ture allows groups to settle and, hence, to take control over a territory. Second, 
compared to hunting and gathering, agriculture is an extremely efficient mode 
of calorie production. Hence, agriculture allows populations to grow to a size 
when it becomes meaningful and even necessary (see below) to rely on more 
formalized forms of social organization. Third, agriculture and fixed settle-
ments enable food storage. Storage of food is linked to important features of 
the state as it allows taxation and subsequently the emergence of division of 
labor. In hunter/gatherer-societies, all members are involved in the subsistence 
economy whereas storage of taxed food allows a part of the population to de-
vote their full time to non-subsistence related activities. Thus, storage provides 
the precondition for social classes not directly involved in production such as 
public servants and professional soldiers. 
These arguments imply that agriculture provides the preconditions for state 
formation. However, the links between the two phenomena run deeper. Hence, 
in the words of Gellner (1988: 21), the Neolithic revolution “encourages, and 
often perhaps necessitates, the emergence of specialized agencies of coercion”, 
i.e., the formation of states. In their comprehensive account of anthropological 
research on the evolution of human societies, Johnson and Earle (2000) argue 
that the population growth following agricultural transition ignites an autocata-
lytic process when population growth creates a pressure for the intensification 
of the subsistence economy which, subsequently, causes further population 
increase and further production intensification etc. These accelerating pressures 
for production intensifications have a number of important consequences. First, 
they leave fewer buffers against starvation in bad years making collective sys-
tems of risk management more attractive. Second, they facilitate resource com-
petition (and ultimately, warfare) which fuels group-wide integration and allow 
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efficient leaders to emerge (see also Graber & Roscoe, 1988). Third, they put 
premium on more sophisticated production technology, a development that 
requires community-wide collaboration. Fourth, they increase the benefits of 
trading and thereby also the transfer of decision-making power to single indi-
viduals such as the head trader (Johnson & Earle, 2000: 30-32). In sum, based 
on current anthropological research, Johnson and Earle (2000) argue that 
managerial problems associated with the consequences of the Neolithic revolu-
tion create pressures to develop more centralized political organizations, a 
process which leads to the formation of the early states (see also Stanish, 
2001). 
Current research suggests that the Neolithic revolution is significant for the 
rise of complex political organization; however, the transition to agriculture did 
not take place at the same time in all parts of the world. For example, the first 
time agriculture emerged in Mesopotamia was around 8500 BC, but it did not 
commence in Western Europe until five thousand years later. Likewise, in 
Australia humans lived for 46,000 years without agriculture until the Europe-
ans eventually introduced it in the late 18th century. Hence, it might be more 
appropriate to talk about revolutions in plural than about a single revolution. To 
the extent the state developed to solve managerial problems arising from agri-
cultural production, this different timing of the reliance on domesticated plants 
and animals in different regions should become a key variable in explaining the 
timing of early state formation. As Diamond (1997) also argued, the earlier a 
region moved from a subsistence economy based on hunting and gathering to 
an agricultural subsistence economy, the earlier the chain reaction is ignited, 
and the earlier it should culminate with the emergence of a state. In other 
words, we expect the timing of the Neolithic revolution in a region to predict 
the timing of the origin of the state. This predicted causal relationship consti-
tutes our first empirical hypothesis (H1, see figure 1). 
Figure 1: Graphical display of hypotheses H1-H5  
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Explaining Neolithic Revolutions 
State-based political organizations first emerged in Mesopotamia because agri-
culture was first invented in this very region. However, in many ways, this just 
begs the question: Why did agriculture emerge so early in this region? In an-
swering this more fundamental question, we are most indebted to Diamond’s 
work. His fundamental insight is that while the timing of the Neolithic revolu-
tion varies markedly across the world, this variability is far from random. Ac-
cording to Diamond, the transition from hunter-gatherer economy to agricul-
tural production constitutes a highly structured – but not necessarily intentional 
– assessment of transitional opportunities. This assessment is affected by a set 
of clearly defined factors relating to the regional existence of plants and ani-
mals suitable for domestication. Hence, to understand the ultimate reasons for 
why states emerged early in, e.g., the Middle East and not in, e.g., Oceania, we 
need to understand the dispersion of domesticable plants and animals. More-
over, this condition urges us to move one step further back in the causal chain 
to investigate the significance of climatic differences. 
A crucial element for the success of agricultural experiments is “to have 
good material to work with” (Olsson & Hibbs, 2005: 916; cf. Peregrine et al., 
2007). Some animal species are simply more suitable for domestication than 
others because of lack of aggressive temperament, herbivorous diet, and a 
psychology adapted to dominance hierarchies. More particularly, out of the 
world’s 148 species of big, terrestrial, and herbivorous animals, only fourteen 
have ever been domesticated. Importantly, nine of these originated in Western 
Eurasia including important species such as the wild ancestors of goats, sheep, 
pigs, and cows. In fact, these four species, which even today predominate agri-
cultural production, come from the Mesopotamian areas, labeled the Fertile 
Crescent, where agriculture first originated (Diamond, 1997: 140-141), and 
where the world’s first states emerged some 5500 years later. Equally, some 
plant species are more suitable for domestication. In this regard, size and taste 
are of course important factors, but crop suitability is affected by a number of 
other more subtle features such as plant life cycle, seed-dispersal mechanisms, 
and pollinating biology (Diamond, 1997: 120, 136-137). Also in the domain of 
plant species, Western Eurasia in general and the Fertile Crescent specifically 
were allotted a massive portion of the world’s material for domestication; out 
of the 56 heaviest-seeded plant species, no less than 33 originated in Eurasia. 
By implication, when the glaciers of the last ice age retreated 11,000 BC and 
changed the regional opportunities for hunting and gathering, the costs and 
benefits associated with agriculture as an alternative subsistence strategy was 
differently dispersed across the regions of the world. Biological preconditions 
for agriculture simply differed across regions. Some regions – such as the Mid-
dle East – had many animals and plants suitable for domestication, other re-
gions – such as the Pacific Islands – had virtually none, which, of course, can 
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be expected to affect the timing of the Neolithic revolution in the specific 
place. The less the transitional costs due to a high number of suitable animals 
and plants, the earlier the transition to agriculture should occur, and the earlier 
the autocatalytic effects on state formation should take off. Our second hy-
pothesis (H2) tests the effect of biological conditions on the timing of transition 
to agriculture. 
The final step in this first causal account of the rise of early states focuses on 
Diamond’s (1997) proposition saying that the existence of favorable fauna for 
the rise of agriculture is related to basic climatic conditions of the region. The 
Mediterranean climate, which dominates large parts of Western Eurasia, is 
particularly superior to the emergence of agriculture compared to other cli-
mates.1 First, the climate is more fertile and more hospitable to plants and large 
animals than in more extreme climate zones such as deserts or tundra. Second, 
diseases harmful to potential domesticable animals and crops are far less preva-
lent compared to otherwise bio-diverse climate zones as the tropics (Kamarck, 
1976). Third, the Mediterranean climate also affects the availability of domes-
ticable material in more subtle ways due to the mild wet winters and long dry 
summers in this climate zone, which specifically selects for plants with an 
annual life cycle (Blumler, 1992; Blumler & Byrne, 1991). Due to their short 
life span, annual plants invest heavily in the growth of seeds, which they use 
for reproduction, and invest significantly less in wood and stems (Diamond, 
1997: 136). Because seeds constitute the edible parts of the plant, annual plans 
are highly attractive to the prospective farmer. Consequently, the Mediterra-
nean climate specifically selects for plants particularly suited for agricultural 
production. 
Given this, our third hypothesis (H3) is that prehistoric climate indirectly 
conditions the timing of the Neolithic revolution through its effect on the avail-
able biological material. Accordingly, we do not expect the difference in the 
timing of the autocatalytic process of production intensification, ultimately 
leading to early state formation, to be caused by a random dispersal of domes-
ticable plants and animals. Rather, we expect this dispersal to be highly struc-
tured by even more basic climatic factors. 
To some extent, H2 and H3 have been tested by Hibbs and Olsson (2004; 
2005) in their important and pioneering work, in which they subject Diamond’s 
account to an empirical test using quantitative data. However, while their 
analyses of the relationship between climatic and biological conditions are 
placed at the country-level (n = 112), the analyses of the effect these conditions 
                                                             
1  Notice, however, that even though the Mediterranean zone of Western Eurasia showed the 
most valuable domestic plants and animals, the other four Mediterranean zones (California, 
Chile, South Africa, and Southwest Australia) were not sites of independent origins of agri-
culture. Moreover, the other eight areas of independent agricultural origin lie outside of 
Mediterranean zones (Diamond, 1997: 99, 138). 
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might have on the timing of agricultural transition are placed at the region-level 
(n = 6). Therefore, these latter analyses are based on a very small number of 
cases and, as Putterman (2008) argues, do not allow for the modeling of differ-
ent pathways to agricultural production within the same region. Furthermore, 
the analyses fail to provide a test of the causal sequence of the argument. Hibbs 
and Osson (2004) demonstrate that climatic factors are correlated with domes-
ticable material, which again is correlated with agricultural transition, but they 
do not directly test the clear suggestion in Diamond’s account that climatic 
factors should influence agricultural transition mediated by the availability of 
domesticable material. We remedy both these shortcomings and take the causal 
sequence one step further by including the timing of state formation. 
Diffusion Processes 
In many ways, the model outlined so far is blind to the fact that humans interact 
not only within societies, but also between societies and even over great dis-
tances. Thus, archaeological evidence clearly supports the notion that large-
distance social exchange has been with our species for hundreds of thousands 
of years (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005) thereby suggesting different pathways 
through which societies can develop an agricultural subsistence economy and 
form a state. First, societies might invent these economic and political tech-
nologies de novo. Thus, in the upper part of figure 1, our model focuses on 
area-specific preconditions for independent agricultural innovations and the 
state. Second, however, the existence of exchange between prehistoric societies 
makes it possible for societies to learn from other societies (Putterman, 2008). 
As Diamond (1997) argues, diffusions of knowledge and technology from one 
society to another transform the transitional costs involved in both agricultural 
transition and state formation and, hence, can be expected to affect the timing 
of both events. 
In this section, we describe how diffusion processes facilitate the autocata-
lytic process of state formation at these two stages. Notice that although diffu-
sion processes surely are social in nature and governed by human agency, we 
expect that the opportunities for engaging in successful diffusion at both stages 
are structured by basic biogeographic factors. 
Agriculture is apparently only invented de novo in six or nine places across 
the entire world (Diamond, 1997: 100). Everywhere else, agriculture was intro-
duced through diffusion, i.e., crops and animals already domesticated were 
disseminated from a founder society to a neighboring society and beyond. Yet, 
the speed with which crops and other technologies of food production spread 
from its founding sources varies (Diamond, 1997: 177). Tellingly, detailed 
archaeological analyses of agricultural transition show how specific crops from 
the Fertile Crescent spread extremely rapidly outwards to Western Europe and 
reached Greece around 6000-5000 BC, central Western Europe between 5000 
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and 3800 BC, and outer areas such as Portugal and Scandinavia between 3800 
and 2500 BC (Diamond, 1997: 181). In contrast, in the Americas, agriculture 
was founded independently at least at two different locations (Mesoamerica 
and Andes/Amazonia), and crops and domesticated animals spread at a much 
slower pace and less far. Diamond argues that continental differences in the 
speed with which domesticated material were diffused relate to differences in 
the shape of continents. Specifically, domesticated material travels easier in 
parallel to than across the latitude of an original starting point and therefore 
spreads more easily across continents with an East-West axis orientation (e.g., 
Eurasia) compared to continents with North-South oriented axes (e.g., the 
Americas) (Diamond, 1997: 176-191). The reason is simply that climate zones 
extend in parallel with latitudes, and that both crops and animals are adapted to 
climate-specific environments. Plants, for example, use climate-specific sea-
sonal changes in day length, temperature, and rainfall to trigger basic processes 
of seed germination, flower development etc. (Diamond, 1997: 184). 
Diamond’s argument implies that societies – located within a climate favor-
able to agriculture – should be less dependent on the existence of original do-
mesticable material, because they will be more able to make use of material 
cultivated by others. Hence, in these societies the transition to agriculture 
should be eased not only because their climate selects for domesticable mate-
rial (cf. H3), but also because the availability of original domesticable material 
in itself becomes less important. However, Diamond’s explanation of the agri-
cultural diffusion points to an additional factor that needs to be considered: It is 
not enough for a society to be able to exploit crops and animals domesticated 
elsewhere; it is equally important that available societies are within reach in 
order to diffuse crops and animals. From the perspective of a specific society, 
one general determinant of whether such material is available would be the size 
of the continental land mass located within the climate belt favorable to agri-
culture. A larger belt should, ceteris paribus, imply a large number of available 
societies from where these materials could be diffused (either directly or indi-
rectly through more proximate societies). 
As Diamond observes, one clear way to measure the size of a climate belt on 
a given land mass is the East-West extension of the land mass. Hence, we pre-
dict that the following combination of geographical factors increases the likeli-
hood of agriculture being diffused to a specific society; the society should have 
a climate favorable to agriculture, and it should be located on a land mass with 
a large East-West extension. Our fourth hypothesis (H4) is that the combination 
of these factors should facilitate agricultural transitions by making societies 
less dependent on the existence of original domesticable species. In effect, H4 
postulates the existence of an interaction effect between these geographical 
conditions and the biological conditions for agriculture so that these biological 
conditions become less important when geography allows the biological mate-
rials to be diffused from elsewhere. 
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Just as the transition to agriculture is technology-intensive, so is the transi-
tion to state-level political organization. Centralized control over a territory 
requires technological solutions to the problems of administration and social 
control. According to Algaze (2001: 213), these solutions were historically 
provided by “cumulative innovations in the ways knowledge were gathered, 
processed and transmitted” relating to, e.g., systems of writing and accounting. 
The importance of administrative technology supports that diffusion also oper-
ated on the processes leading to state formation after the Neolithic revolution. 
In fact, archaeological evidence suggests that states only emerged independ-
ently of outside influence in a few territories such as southern Mesopotamia, 
China, the Indus Valley, and Mexico whereas all other processes of state for-
mation were influenced by diffusion of technology (Price, 1978). 
Trade and other routine social interactions between societies with different 
levels of political complexity were important factors in diffusion-based state 
formation (Price, 1978; Parkinson & Galaty, 2007). This observation is critical 
because it suggests that the early diffusion of administrative technology flowed 
through already-established channels of exchange and, as a result, is regulated 
by the same basic structural factors first to mold these channels of exchange. 
Based on a similar reasoning, Diamond (1997: 261-264) suggests that the geo-
graphic factors examined above not only impinge on the diffusion of food 
production but also on the diffusion of administrative technology. In Dia-
mond’s (1997: 190) own words, “societies that engaged in intense exchange of 
crops, livestock and technologies related to food production were more likely 
to become involved in other exchanges as well”. Hence, societies placed within 
these geographically structured networks of exchange should not only develop 
agricultural food production at an earlier stage (cf. H4), but the economic revo-
lution should also more easily and more quickly translate itself into a political 
revolution in terms of state formation. 
The East-West extension of the continent where a society is located also 
taps another geographical condition that might independently influence the 
potential for diffusion of administrative technology, namely the sheer size of 
the continent. A large continent creates, all else equal, a higher number of 
available societies from which administrative technologies can be diffused 
(Diamond, 1997: 257). Hence, presumably, our compound of geographical 
conditions not only facilitates diffusion of administrative technology through 
already established channels, but also through new channels. Big land masses 
with large East-West extensions simply have more opportunities to create the 
latter. 
The fifth hypothesis (H5) concludes our model of state formation. It predicts 
that the geographical compound of climatic and continental factors influences 
the time span from agricultural transition to state formation because it regulates 
to which extent societies can learn administrative technologies through both 
new and established exchange channels. Correspondingly, H5 postulates the 
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existence of an interaction effect between these geographical conditions and the 
timing of the Neolithic Revolution in a given society such that the timing be-
comes less important for the subsequent timing of state formation when geog-
raphy allows for diffusion. 
Hibbs and Olsson (2004; Olsson and Hibbs, 2005) and Putterman (2008) 
have provided the most thorough test of these arguments to date. Regarding 
H4, Hibbs and Olsson’s (2004) analyses demonstrate strong linear effects of 
the outlined geographic conditions on the availability of domesticable material 
and on the timing of agricultural transition. Putterman has replicated and re-
fined these analyses with more detailed measurements of agricultural transition. 
However, in both cases, they fail to model the interactive relationship specified 
in H4, presumably, because Hibbs and Olsson’s scores of the measure of do-
mesticable material are assigned on a regional rather than a national basis. As 
all countries within a region are assigned the same scores, it simply becomes 
more difficult to model diffusion processes within a region. Yet, as we show in 
our analysis, even in face of this conservative test condition, H4 is still sup-
ported. Regarding H5, the present study is to our knowledge the first to provide 
a systematic quantitative test of this hypothesis. Importantly, however, Putter-
man (2008) provides some initial evidence for the hypothesis by showing that 
regional measures of agricultural transition, which take diffusion effects into 
account, are superior to country-specific measures in predicting subsequent 
economic developments in individual countries. 
Timing of Transitions and Developments in Stateness 
We have argued for the existence of an unbroken causal chain that began with 
the withdrawal of the glaciers of the last Ice Age and ended with the formation 
of a state within a certain territory. For some countries, this causal process has 
culminated within the last few centuries, but for a large number of countries the 
emergence of state-level political organization took place several thousand 
years ago. Hence, one might wonder whether these archaic processes are rele-
vant for understanding the subsequent course of states, and more specifically 
whether the effects of the timing of the archaic economic and political transi-
tions reveal themselves even in the modern political landscape. The core claim 
we pursue in this section is that, “the state is an adaptive success” (Price, 1978: 
161). Thus, for the major part of state history, societies with more ancient states 
have had competitive advantages over, first, non-state societies and, second, 
societies with less developed states, meaning that the course of states’ history 
has been significantly shaped by the timing of their formation (Diamond, 1997; 
see also Chanda & Putterman, 2007). 
The success of the state as a form of political organization is related to both 
its internal and external strengths (Cohen, 1978). As argued earlier, the state is 
formed in parts because it solves specific internal problems relating to produc-
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tion intensification. These problems do not wither away with the formation of 
an initial state, but continue to intensify as the solutions brought about by a 
centralized political organization allow populations to increase further. This 
again requires further intensifications of food production, and subsequently 
increased social coordination and centralization etc. (Johnson & Earle, 2000). 
In this respect, it is vital that the state is the first political organization in human 
history with seemingly unlimited growth potential which exactly allows it to 
continuously meet the increased demands of centralization and expansion. As 
argued by Cohen (1978: 4),”hunting bands, locally autonomous food produc-
ers, and chieftaincies each build up the polity to some critical point and then 
send off subordinate segments to found new units”, while the state “can expand 
without splitting, incorporate other polities and ethnic groups, and become 
more populous, more heterogeneous, and more powerful, with no known upper 
limit on its size or strength”. Because of increased intensification requirements 
and the states’ ability to meet them, we expect that where states have initially 
been formed, territories do not reverse back to less complex modes of political 
organizations. The autocatalytic processes propelling the states into being also 
ensure their persistence and continued expansion. 
These internal state functions are paralleled by external advantages of states 
over non-state societies in conflicts, violent as well as non-violent. The advan-
tages consist of 1) more numerous forces of both labour and soldiers as a con-
sequence of larger populations; 2) more coordinated production strategies (see 
e.g., Parkinson & Galaty, 2007) and, in the case of warfare, more coordinated 
attack and defence strategies; and 3) higher levels of technological develop-
ment in general and more sophisticated technology of production and warfare 
in particular (Diamond, 1997: 281). The latter advantage relates to the simple 
fact that technological inventions require a certain level of specialization and 
division of labour which has solely developed in societies with state-level 
organizations. Because of these competitive advantages, more complexly or-
ganized societies have continuously outcompeted and overtaken less complex 
societies up to the point when almost all societies in the contemporary world 
are under some form of government control. Notice, however, that this set of 
factors is not only relevant for the relative power between states and non-state 
societies but also for the relative power between different states. This means 
that more populated, more centralized, and more technologically developed 
states should, all things being equal, dominate less populated, less centralized, 
and less developed states. 
Population growth and intense technological developments are continuous 
processes, which are triggered at the very point in time when societies adopt 
agricultural modes of production, and they are intensified by the emergence of 
state-level political organization. Therefore, we simply expect that differences 
in the timing of these events will influence the relative power of societies sub-
sequently. There is one clear implication of this, viz. that territories with late 
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state formation have had greater difficulties in achieving the status of inde-
pendent statehood in the course of state history. In principle, we should expect 
these effects to hold up to the near past. However, as argued and demonstrated 
by Putterman (2008; Chanda & Putterman, 2007), diffusion processes again 
impinge on the effects of timing and do so in more dramatic ways than before. 
These processes took off with the great voyages of discovery, beginning in the 
late 15th century and headed by pioneers such as Christopher Columbus, Vasco 
da Gama, and Ferdinand Magellan, the European colonization of the Americas, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and Oceania, it took off.  
As a result, diffusion processes extended over far greater ranges than before 
in human history and were much less blocked by ecological and geographical 
barriers. Previously, diffusion involved conquests of neighbouring societies 
largely influenced by the same geographical and biological conditions as the 
conquerors. In these cases, differences in the social complexity of the con-
quered and the conqueror were relatively minimal. Post-Columbian coloniza-
tions, in contrast, broke the links between social complexity and biogeography 
because developments in transportation technology (e.g., the invention of long 
range ships) allowed states to colonize societies, whose history had been 
shaped by highly different biogeographical factors. In this way, state institu-
tions diffused to societies with low levels of complexity and technological 
development. When these colonies subsequently received independence, their 
inherited level of technological development was at odds with the actual timing 
of their agricultural transition and first state formation. 
Accordingly, we expect that the timing of agricultural transition and, espe-
cially, the timing of state formation to predict, consistently and strongly, a 
given territory’s levels of stateness in the pre-Columbian period, i.e., up until 
1500. However, the effects of these predictions begin to unravel in the post-
Columbian period and to accelerate after around 1800 when the Western pow-
ers got serious about taking over the globe. These predictions constitute our 
hypotheses 6 (H6) and 7 (H7) as illustrated in figure 2. 
Putterman (2008) has provided the most thorough tests of these hypotheses 
to date. Using large-n quantitative methods, he has demonstrated that the tim-
ing of the Neolithic revolution is a strong predictor of cross-country differences 
in economic performance in 1500, but a much poorer predictor of performance 
in 1997. However, our hypotheses expand on these findings in two ways. First, 
by proposing that these findings are also present when the independent variable 
is the timing of first state formation, and when the independent variables are 
subsequent levels of local state control. Second, we predict that timing consis-
tently predicts the existence of a state over the full pre-Columbian period, and 
that 1500 constitutes the exact moment in history – a critical juncture – when 
the relationship begins to unravel.  
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Figure 2: Expected development over time in correlation between the timing of 
first state transformation in a given territory and degree of stateness in the 
territory 
 
 
As Putterman (2008) also argued, the unravelling of the relationship pre-
dicted by H7 is a direct consequence of the basic theoretical argument outlined 
in the previous sections of this article. The background for the described pat-
terns of colonization is exactly that biogeographical factors endowed different 
continents with different obstacles for development. Hence, Diamond’s (1997) 
main thesis is that the Europeans conquered the New World and not vice versa 
because Europe had more favorable conditions for agriculture and state forma-
tion compared to the Americas, which thus accelerated Europe’s technological 
and institutional development. 
Measurement 
To minimize problems of selection bias, we have compiled data for as many 
countries as possible. Hibbs and Olsson base their analyses on 112 countries, 
whereas our dataset is complete for 171 countries concerning all the variables 
of the basic model from geographic background conditions to state formation. 
We use today’s countries as observational units although the most relevant 
units of analysis have changed significantly over time. The main reason is that 
most of our measurements are based on the datasets and coding rules provided 
by Hibbs and Olsson, on the one hand, and Putterman, on the other. Moreover, 
like them, we are interested in studying possible impacts of ultimate factors on 
contemporary differences and similarities. 
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The measurement of the conditions is necessarily rough, but Hibbs and Ols-
son and Putterman have suggested and constructed reasonable proxies. As 
regards the geographical conditions, they are measured by three variables. The 
first variable is the East-West extension as measured by the continent’s dis-
tance in longitudinal degrees between the points most to the east and west not 
situated in the infertile regions near the poles. Or, if there is no direct connec-
tion with the core landmass of a continent, the horizontal extension of the is-
land or island group is used. Hibbs and Olsson divide the East-West distance 
with the North-South distance to construct a measure of the orientation of the 
landmasses. However, even though Diamond emphasizes the importance of a 
continent’s axis, the theoretically important aspect is whether the horizontal, 
land-based diffusion of plants, animals, technology etc. is facilitated; a rela-
tionship, which is not modified by a long North-South distance. We thus argue 
that the broadness of a continent is more important than its axis. Empirically 
speaking, this adjustment does not make much of a difference since the land-
masses with a horizontal axis also tend to have the longest East-West extension 
and vice versa. Note, furthermore, that the correlation of our measure of broad-
ness shows an extremely high correlation with landmass size (island, island 
group, continent) on which the country is situated (Pearson’s r=0.911, p < 
0.000). In this way, the variable also reflects size as emphasized in the elabora-
tion of the diffusion hypotheses. 
Concerning climate, we follow Olsson and Hibbs (2004) and measure the 
condition by using two variables. The first, a four-point scale, distinguishes 
between climates according to their favorability to agriculture. This measure is 
based on the Köppen climate classification system2 that combines average 
annual and monthly temperatures and precipitation and the seasonality of pre-
cipitation. The other variable used to capture climate is distance from equator 
in absolute latitude degrees.3 We use the scores (regression method) from the 
first principal component of these two variables to measure the climate factor. 
To measure the geographic potential for diffusion, we employ the first principal 
component scores of all three geographic variables. 
The biogeographic factor is also captured by variables constructed by Hibbs 
and Olsson. First, the number of domesticable plants in the region, that is, 
annual or perennial wild grasses known to exist in prehistory with a mean 
kernel weight exceeding 10 milligrams. Second, the number of domesticable 
animals in the region, that is, big mammals weighing more than 45 kilos pre-
                                                             
2  The data used are from Hibbs and Olsson’s (Hibbs, 2005) dataset. When filling in the 
missing values, we employed their coding rules. 
3  The data are from the World Bank (1999) – also used by Hibbs and Olsson – supplemented 
with information from CIA’s The World Factbook in case of missing values. 
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sent in prehistory.4 In our model, the scores derived from the principal compo-
nent of these variables to construct a combined measure. Note that the scores of 
this variable have been assigned on a regional rather than national basis. Hence, 
diffusion is already integrated in the measure, meaning that our diffusion con-
dition faces a very conservative test when it comes to explaining agricultural 
transition. 
There is a similar problem with Hibbs and Olsson’s data on the transition 
from reliance upon gathering and hunting to reliance upon agriculture. Fortu-
nately, Putterman has constructed a more detailed, country-specific dataset on 
the number of years before the present (i.e., 2000 A.D.) since such transition 
took place. The dataset is based on readings of expert judgments of when peo-
ple in particular areas got more than half of their calories from cultivated foods 
and domesticated animals. For countries with little archaeological evidence 
available, an estimate, by means of interpolation, was based on evidence about 
the flow and spread of farming in neighboring countries and the region. We use 
Putterman’s data to capture the timing of the Neolithic revolution.5 
The ‘endpoint’ of our basic model is initial state formation. To operational-
ize this variable, we have gathered information on when a government above 
the tribal/chiefdom level, such as kingdoms, empires, city-states, national states 
etc., was originally initiated in or induced upon the area represented by present-
day countries. The variable is measured in number of years before the present 
(i.e., 2000 A.D.). We have primarily relied on a corresponding component in 
Putterman’s State Antiquity Index based on the historical accounts presented in 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica. However, this dataset does not include a number 
of small countries, and it only dates back to year 1 A.D., when many areas had 
long had significant experiences with state formation, some even for several 
thousand years. Thus, to support our analysis, we have assigned scores accord-
ing to information provided by different country-specific, historical, and re-
gional entries in the same source for an additional 65 countries.6 Having done 
so, we can only comply with Putterman’s (2007) remark that coding this issue 
has been “extremely difficult because the demarcation between tribes and states 
is imperfect and includes many shades of gray. Also, the available information 
is often quite incomplete”, especially regarding the remote past. This said, 
however, the dataset is the best available given the request of a scope general 
and broad enough to suit our investigation.  
                                                             
4  The specific data are from Hibbs and Olsson’s (Hibbs, 2005) dataset, but, in contrast to 
them, we do not assign the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand the same 
values as Europe. When filling in the missing values, we employed their coding rules. 
5  We have supplemented the dataset with eight additional cases, all small countries, follow-
ing Putterman’s guidelines. Documentation of the sources will be provided upon request. 
6  Documentation of the specific information used to score the cases will be provided upon 
request. 
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Moving beyond the operationalization of the basic model, we use Putter-
man’s State Antiquity Index to measure the degree of stateness. The index 
scores cover each of the 39 half centuries dividing the period from 1 to 1950 
A.D. They are based on evaluations of three questions: 1) Is there a govern-
ment above the tribal/chiefdom level? (yes=1 point, no=0 points); 2) Is this 
government foreign or locally based? (locally based=1 point, foreign based/co-
lony=0.5 points, local government with substantial foreign oversight=0.75); 3) 
How much of the territory of the modern country was ruled by this govern-
ment? (over 50 percent=1 point, between 25 percent and 50 percent=0.75, 
between 10 percent and 25 percent=0.5 points, less than 10 percent=0.3). The 
scores on the three questions have been combined through multiplication and 
then multiplied by the number of years, i.e., 50. In this way, a country has been 
assigned the value of 50 if it was an autonomous state in the period in question, 
25 if the entire area was ruled by another country, 0 if it had no government 
above the tribal/chiefdom level, etc. 
Finally, it should be noted that the importance of inter-regional diffusion 
processes implies that countries from the same region are more similar than 
countries from different regions. As our observational units are countries, this 
violates the assumption of independence of observations. To avoid estimation 
bias, we use cluster robust estimators. Specifically, in all analyses the following 
nine regions are specified as clusters: 1) Pacific Islands, 2) Australia, 3) South 
America, 4) Central America, 5) North America, 6) Sub-Saharan Africa, 7) 
Southeast Asia, 8) East Asia, 9) Near East, Europe and North Africa. This 
division follows the systems of agricultural diffusion (Hibbs & Olsson, 2005).7 
Results 
We begin our empirical analysis of the derived hypotheses in the distant end of 
the causal sequence established theoretically. Hence, our initial analyses dem-
onstrate how geographical and biological factors influence the timing of the 
Neolithic revolution in different areas by serving as preconditions and by regu-
lating the potential for diffusion. Subsequently, we turn to the main variable 
around which our argument has been organized – i.e., the timing of the first 
state formation in a given area – and investigate the diverse effects of Neolithic 
revolutions and biological and geographical conditions. Finally, we show how 
early states consistently seem to have been endowed with competitive advan-
tages with respect to stateness from 0 AD up to the near past. 
                                                             
7  The only exception is that Hibbs and Olsson classify the Pacific Islands and Iceland to-
gether because both lack prehistoric domesticable material. As we are interested in correct-
ing for regional similarities, we instead classify Iceland with the rest of Europe. 
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In table 1, we test H3, which links climatic factors to the availability of do-
mesticable material within an area. The data show strong support for our hy-
pothesis. As revealed in table 1, the effect of a favorable climate for agriculture 
on the biological conditions for agricultural transition is highly significant and 
explains 54 percent of the variance in prehistoric differences in available do-
mesticates.8 This result replicates Hibbs and Olson’s (2004) earlier conclusions, 
but also testifies to the robustness of Diamond’s account as our data contains 
around 65 percent more cases. 
Table 1: Explaining the Existence of Biological Conditions for the  
Neolithic Revolution. 
 Model 
Intercept -0.006 (0.037) 
Climate 1.042*** (0.065) 
R2 (adj.) 0.539 
Notes. N=171. Cases are contemporary countries. Entries are OLS-regression coefficients 
with cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Measures of climate, biological and geo-
graphical conditions are scaled between 0-1, where 0 equals least favourable conditions and 1 
equals most favourable conditions. 
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001 (two-sided t-tests). 
 
In table 2, we investigate whether these conditions also influence the timing 
of transition to agriculture. Our causal model suggests that climatic factors 
should indirectly accelerate the transition to agriculture by regulating the pre-
historic availability of domesticable material which is tested in models 1 and 2. 
Model 1 demonstrates a highly significant and positive effect of climate on the 
timing of the Neolithic revolution. Specifically, the agricultural transition hap-
pens around 3800 years before in areas where the climate was favorable to 
agriculture compared to areas with unfavorable climate. As expected, this posi-
tive effect of climate disappears in model 2, where we control for the more 
proximate factor in the causal sequence, i.e., biological conditions in the form 
of prehistoric availability of domesticates. In line with H2, biological condi-
tions have a significant, positive, and large effect on the timing of the Neolithic 
revolution in a given area; therefore, societies with the most favorable condi-
tions on average shift from hunting and gathering to agricultural modes of 
production 5600 years before societies with the least favorable conditions. The 
inclusion of this factor boosts the explained variance to 64 percent. Hence, we 
are able to replicate the findings of Hibbs and Olsson using a much larger 
                                                             
8  Notice that the explanatory power would probably have been even higher if diffusion had 
not been integrated in the measure of biological conditions. 
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number of cases and a more fine-grained measurement of the timing of agricul-
tural transition. Furthermore, for the first time, we have provided general evi-
dence of the causal sequence between climate, domesticable material, and the 
timing of the Neolithic revolution. This indirect effect of climate through the 
availability of domesticable material can be further tested using Sobel’s formal 
test of mediation. In line with our causal sequence, we find that the measure of 
biological conditions significantly mediate the relationship between climate 
and the timing of agricultural transition (Sobel’s z = 10.612, p < 0.000).9 
Table 2: Explaining the Timing of the Neolithic Revolution. 
Model # Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 2986.159*** (261.264) 
3019.186*** 
(165.58) 
2752.164*** 
(370.282) 
Climate 3755.623*** (514.862) 
-2093.570** 
(520.221) 
-5855.345*** 
(1169.682) 
Biological conditions - 5613.769*** (396.552) 
5395.770*** 
(890.507) 
Geographical conditions - - 6547.441*** (1094.293) 
Diffusion term: Geographi-
cal  Biological conditions 
- - -2328.725* 
(1583.946) 
R2 (adj.) 0.209 0.643 0.684 
Notes. N=171. Cases are contemporary countries. Entries are OLS-regression coefficients 
with cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Measures of climate, biological and geo-
graphical conditions are scaled between 0-1, where 0 equals least favourable conditions and 1 
equals most favourable conditions. 
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001 (two-sided t-tests). 
 
In model 3, we test H4, which states that prehistoric endowments of domes-
ticable material is less important for the timing of agricultural transition in 
areas with favorable geographical conditions for diffusion of domesticates from 
other societies. The hypothesis is tested by including our measure of geo-
graphical conditions and a two-way interaction term between the geographical 
and biological conditions. The negative sign of the interaction term confirms 
our expectation, and the term reaches significance. Hence, a society’s initial 
                                                             
9  While the biological conditions fully mediate any positive effect of climate on the timing of 
the Neolithic revolution, Model 2 reveals a significant negative effect of climate after inclu-
sion of biological conditions. Presumably, the reason is that our climate variable measures 
the present and not the prehistoric climate. Whereas climate has generally not changed 
much over the period in consideration, in a range of the Middle-Eastern areas, where agri-
culture originally emerged, climate has changed significantly to the worse (Diamond, 1997: 
410-411). Thus, these cases have low to average values on the climate measure but excep-
tionally high values on the transition measure, which – when controlling for biological con-
ditions – facilitates a negative correlation between climate and the timing of agricultural 
transition. 
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endowment of domesticable material is less important when the geographical 
conditions are favorable for the diffusion of domesticates from other societies. 
The moderate p-value of the interaction term should be judged against the fact 
that the available measure of prehistoric biological conditions already takes 
some diffusion into account that reduces the variation left to be explained. Still, 
the data corroborate H4 and testify the importance of diffusion of domesticated 
crops and livestock for the timing of the Neolithic revolution. Thus, our tests of 
H3, H2, and H4 support Diamond’s claim that the agricultural transition is 
structured by basic climatic, continental and biological factors. Far from being 
a random process, the different timings of the Neolithic revolutions in different 
parts of the world was largely linked to the different climatic and biological 
conditions, which appeared after the last ice age. 
Our main argument says that agricultural transition triggers an autocatalytic 
process leading to the formation of the state, and, in particular, that the earlier 
this process is offset, the earlier centralized political organization has emerged 
in a given area (H1). The results linked to our test of these processes and their 
dependencies on geographically structured diffusion are presented in table 3. In 
order to evaluate the causal logic of our theoretical model, we begin our test of 
H1 by moving one step backwards in the causal chain and by investigating the 
indirect effects of biological conditions. 
Table 3: Explaining the Timing of the First State Formation  
in a Given Territory. 
Model # Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 702.649*** (89.478) 
-346.980 
(111.378) 
317.817 
(131.931) 
206.482 
(179.331) 
Biological condi-
tions 
1808.492*** 
(193.128) 
-32.920 
(259.808) 
46.824 
(259.706) 
746.457* 
(314.860) 
Timing of Neoli-
thic revolution - 
0.406*** 
(0.044) 
0.065 
(0.086) 
0.050 
(0.091) 
Quadratic term: 
Timing of Neo-
lithic revolution2 
- - 3.210-5**(6.6910-6) 
4.8310-5*** 
(6.5410-6) 
Geographical 
conditions - - - 
627.754 
(505.390) 
Diffusion term: 
Geographical  
Timing of Neo-
lithic Revolution 
- - - -0.352*** (0.102) 
R2 (adj.) 0.366 0.605 0.636 0.675 
Notes. N=171. Cases are contemporary countries. Entries are OLS-regression coefficients 
with cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Measures of climate, biological and geo-
graphical conditions are scaled between 0-1, where 0 equals least favourable conditions and 1 
equals most favourable conditions. 
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001 (two-sided t-tests). 
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Model 1 reveals a strong and highly significant effect of biological condi-
tions on the timing of the first state formation in a given area. The results indi-
cate that states on average emerged 1800 years before in societies with favor-
able biological conditions for agriculture than in societies with unfavorable 
conditions. Model 2 integrates the timing of the Neolithic revolution, and in 
line with the outlined causal sequence this inclusion removes any effect from 
the biological conditions for agriculture. Not surprisingly, formal tests of me-
diation reveal that the timing of the agricultural transition significantly medi-
ates the effect of biological conditions for agriculture on state formation (z = 
8.703, p < 0.000). Furthermore, the data clearly support H1. The measure of 
agricultural transition is highly significant and positive, as expected, and the 
timing of the agricultural transition alone explains a massive 61 percent of the 
variance in the timing of state formation. Thus, the two transitions are directly 
linked, and the earlier a society moved from reliance on hunting and gathering 
to reliance on agricultural food production, the earlier a state emerges. Specifi-
cally, the first state in a given area is on average about 40 percent as old as 
agricultural production in the same area. An inspection of the empirical pattern 
suggests that the relationship between the timing of the two events is not 
strictly linear but more curvilinear. To avoid misspecification, this relationship 
is modeled in model 3, where a quadratic term for the timing of the Neolithic 
revolution is included. The quadratic term is highly significant, and this more 
refined modeling of the relationship raises the explained variance slightly. The 
precise nature of this quadratic relationship is discussed below. 
In model 4, H5 is tested by including our measure of geographical condi-
tions for diffusion and a diffusion term in the form of a two-way interaction 
term between the conditions and the timing of the Neolithic revolution. The 
interaction term is highly significant and increases the explained variance to 68 
percent. To ease the interpretation of this highly complex model involving both 
quadratic and interactive effects, figure 3 graphically displays the effects. 
If we first focus on the curvilinear relationships, we see that, when we move 
closer to the present, they are caused by accelerating processes of state forma-
tion. Presumably, this acceleration is the result of the exact diffusion processes 
under investigation. Hence, as we move towards the present, the administrative 
technology that societies receive through diffusion has become continuously 
more sophisticated which again has allowed for a quicker transition to state 
formation.10 In line with this explanation, the interaction effect reveals that this 
curvilinear effect is strongest among the societies with the best geographical 
potential for diffusion. In fact, if we split the measure of geographical condi-
tions in three and conduct separate analyses for each group, we find no quad-
ratic effect in the group with the worst geographical conditions. This finding 
                                                             
10  For a related discussion on diffusion of agricultural technology, see Putterman (2008). 
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supports H5. We have thus demonstrated that not only the timing of a society’s 
agricultural transition but also the timing of the creation of state is strongly 
affected by two ultimate factors, which structure the diffusion of technological 
innovations: the climate zone in which the society is embedded and its location 
in the East-West extension of the continent. 
Figure 3: Relationship between the timing of the Neolithic revolution in a given 
territory and the timing of first state formation in the territory. Predicted values 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
0
20
00
40
00
60
00
80
00
10
00
0
Timing of Neolithic Revolution (years before 
2000)
Ti
m
in
g 
of
 S
ta
te
 
Fo
rm
at
io
n
(y
ea
rs
 b
ef
or
e 
20
00
)
Geographical conditions: Worst
Medium
Best
 
 
In sum, our analyses support our causal model displayed in figure 1. Fur-
thermore, these analyses, to our knowledge, provide the first valid quantitative 
demonstration of Diamond’s (1997) account of state formation and the most 
extensive tests in general of the biogeographical processes operating behind 
early state formation. Now that the explanation of the timing of state formation 
is established, we turn towards investigating the effects of this timing. Our 
basic hypothesis is that the timing of the state influences its relative competi-
tiveness such that societies with earlier states are more likely to retain inde-
pendence over their territory (H6). However, as predicted by H7, we expect 
this relationship to unravel with the great voyages of discovery and the un-
precedented diffusion of stateness following in their wake, first and foremost 
through the processes of colonization and subsequent decolonization. 
Figure 4 displays Pearson’s correlations between the measures of the socie-
ties’ level of stateness once in every half-century from 0 AD to 1950 AD and 
the timings of societies’ agricultural transition and first state formation, respec-
tively. To ease interpretation, we have marked the years 1500 and 1800 in the 
figure.  
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Figure 4: Development over time in correlation between timing for events and 
degree of stateness in a given territory. 
 
At the outset, one should notice both the remarkable similarity in the effects 
of the timing variables and the consistent differences in the effects of the vari-
ables. Across the entire period (except for the last data point), the timing of the 
first state formation has a larger effect on stateness than the timing of agricul-
tural transition, which is highly expected, as the effect of the former should be 
indirect through the latter. Furthermore, from 0 AD and up to about 1300, we 
see extraordinary high and consistent effects of the timing variables on state-
ness. The correlations are positive, which, in line with H6, means that earlier 
states are more likely to show high degrees of stateness. After 1300, we see a 
slight drop in the effect sizes. But they are continuously above 0.50 until 1500, 
when we – as predicted by H7 – see stronger decline in the correlation coeffi-
cients. From around 1800, they drop dramatically when the West European 
states became heavily occupied with the colonization of the rest of the world. 
Hence, both H6 and H7 are supported by our data.11 
                                                             
11  We can make a preliminary test of whether diffusion actually accounts for the unraveling of 
the relationship. If processes of European colonization and subsequent decolonization are 
responsible for the unraveling of the relationship, we should be able to adjust for these ef-
fects by adjusting for the migration of Europeans to the colonies. In line with this, Putter-
man (2008) demonstrates that present levels of income are much better predicted by historic 
data when adjusted for the migration of Europeans. Specifically, for societies outside 
Europe, we control for the population’s proportion of European descendents (Acemoglu et 
al., 2001). As this measure specifically taps the proportion of descendents in 1975, we limit 
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Conclusion 
Today, states are among the most important factors in shaping the conditions of 
life and death of people around world. As Tilly (1992: 4) argues, “anyone who 
dreams of a stateless world seems a headless visionary”. Yet, the state is a 
recent invention in the course of human evolution, which for millennia has 
been predominated by small hunter-gatherer groups with flat hierarchies (Boyd 
& Silk, 2003). How, then, did this – on an evolutionary time scale – rapid 
transformation occur from a world without states to a world where the non-
existence of states is almost unthinkable? 
The account we have put forth emphasizes that this transition is not as much 
about the individual excellence of certain populations or entrepreneurs.12 
Rather, the state-centered political world of today is the outcome of deep struc-
tural forces and, especially, the fact that after the last ice age certain bio-
geographical configurations facilitated a transition to more effective calorie 
production. Consecutively, it created a need for more effective mechanisms of 
social control over expanding populations locked in competition with other 
similarly expanding populations. Our key argument in this regard has been that 
the regional differences in biogeography influenced the timing of the Neolithic 
revolution and, in turn, the timing of state formation. 
In essence, the study has provided a statistical test of Diamond’s wide-
ranging account of the transition from the small-scale politics of ancestral 
hunter/gatherer groups to large-scale state-centered politics. While this is not 
the first quantitative study to explore Diamond’s account of the impact of bio-
geography and the Neolithic revolution, it is the first to focus on state forma-
tion and the most comprehensive attempt to model the causal logic of Dia-
mond’s argument. Hence, we have been able to show, first, that climatic factors 
influenced the timing of the Neolithic revolution because they regulated the 
availability of domesticable material. Similarly, we have shown that this avail-
ability influenced the timing of the early state formation because it regulated 
the timing of the Neolithic revolution. Second, we have shown that climatic 
and continental differences influence the timing of both agricultural production 
and state formation through two different pathways. Hence, these bio-
                                                                                                                                
the analyses to the two data points closest to 1975, i.e., 1900 and 1950. Before control, 
Pearson’s correlations between timing of first state formation and stateness are 0.11 (p = 
0.19) and 0.06 (p = 0.48), respectively. After control, the correlations rise to 0.19 (p = 0.02) 
and 0.17 (p = 0.046). Hence, in both 1900 and 1950, early states have significantly higher 
levels of independent stateness after control for post-Columbian migration of European set-
tlers. However, without this control, the effect is insignificant and practically nil. 
12  Even though there are good reasons to dismiss the role of great individuals in most cases, 
we are open to espousing their role in certain types of cases. Early states did not arise from 
simple tribal societies but from already complex chiefdoms. Whereas great individuals 
could not turn a tribe into a state, several cases show that great individuals can turn devel-
oped chiefdoms into states (Jared Diamond, personal communication). 
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geographic factors have shaped both the extent of different societies’ ability to 
invent the necessary technology de novo and the potential for diffusion of these 
technological advances from other societies. Finally, we have demonstrated 
that the timing of early state formation is an important factor in later historic 
processes. Hence, early states have consistently had a competitive edge com-
pared to later states in a large part of the history of states. As expected, this 
relationship unraveled after 1500. Around 1500, the great voyages of discovery 
offset processes of colonization and subsequent decolonization, which facili-
tated massive diffusions of agricultural and state technology to societies with 
less favorable prehistoric conditions. 
On the one hand, with focus on early state formation, we have been able to 
move beyond the traditional scope of the state formation literature. This litera-
ture has been preoccupied with the European formation of national states and 
has perceived this experience as providing the general model of state formation 
processes. In contrast, we have focused on states as the more general phenome-
non of political coercion-wielding organizations above the level of chiefdoms 
that not only includes national states but all kinds of states, for example, em-
pires and feudal states. This broader conception of the state also allowed us to 
move beyond Europe and investigate more ultimate factors behind state forma-
tion. On the other hand, however, the present study provides important pieces 
to the puzzle of why it, specifically, was the European model of the state that 
came to dominate in the world of today. Hence, as demonstrated, the competi-
tiveness of European states grew (at least, in part) out of the continent’s bio-
geography, which facilitated both an early transition to agriculture and the 
emergence of early states. In the European case, these biogeographic factors 
seem to have interacted with other local circumstances facilitating the devel-
opment of highly competitive and expansion-oriented states. Especially the 
existence of a larger number of small states continuously contending each other 
in contrast to large and long-lasting empires, such as in China and the Middle 
East, tends to be a decisive factor (cf. Tilly, 1992; Jones, 2003; Darwin, 2008). 
These considerations also imply that it would be wrong to take the unravel-
ing of the relationship between the measures of the timing of early state forma-
tion and of current stateness as an indicator that timing does not matter today. 
First, indirectly, it obviously matters as it has set the stage for the modern his-
torical processes. Second, today all countries with very few exceptions (e.g., 
Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan) display stateness in the sense of having inde-
pendent control over their territory. The state as a type of organization has 
spread throughout the whole world and is an adaptive success in this sense too. 
Hence, if the timing of first state formation matters today, it matters to factors 
beyond stateness. Economic studies have for example shown that the timing of 
the Neolithic revolution influences current GDP pr. capita and other features of 
economic capacity (Putterman, 2008). Similarly, we might find that earlier 
states have greater state capacity, are more politically stable, or have more 
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effective administrations. Quite simply, one might expect that the longer a state 
has been able to learn, the more effective it will be in devising social control. 
Further research will tell whether this is indeed the case.  
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